U.S. Supreme Court Cases

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U.S. RIGHT TO TRAVEL CASE LAW

The case law excerpts below are from published opinions of the United States Supreme Court. It's important to also know, some case excerpts below are dicta and others are the actual holdings. A portion of the dicta cited below is precedent from other prior cases,… the holdings are the law of the land and must be followed by all U.S. and state courts:

"In any event, freedom to travel throughout the United States has long been recognized as a basic right under the Constitution." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)

"Our nation has thrived on the principle that, outside areas of plainly harmful conduct, every American is left to shape his own life as he thinks best, do what he pleases, go where he pleases." ....The right to travel is a part of the ‘liberty’ of which the citizen cannot be deprived without the due process of law under the Fifth Amendment. So much is conceded by the Solicitor General. In Anglo-Saxon law that right was emerging at least as early as the Magna Carta." Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958)

“The conclusion that the right of free movement is a right of national citizenship stands on firm historical ground. If a state tax on that movement, as in the Crandall case, is invalid, a fortiori a state statute which obstructs or in substance prevents that movement must fall.”…

"Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution delegates to the Congress the authority to regulate interstate commerce. And it is settled beyond question that the transportation of persons is ‘commerce’, within the meaning of that provision." Edwards v. People of State of California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941)

 "A carriage is peculiarly a family or household article. It contributes in a large degree to the health, convenience, comfort, and welfare of the householder or of the family." Arthur v Morgan, 113 U.S. 495, 500, 5 S.Ct. 241, 243 S.D. NY (1884)  Found on page 3 in Westlaw pdf 

“Undoubtedly the right of locomotion, the right to remove from one place to another according to inclination, is an attribute of personal liberty, and the right, ordinarily, of free transit from or through the territory of any state is a right secured by the 14th Amendment and by other provisions of the Constitution.” Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274, 21 S.Ct. 128, 45 L.Ed. 186 (1900) Found page 3 in Westlaw pdf 

"The right to travel interstate by auto vehicle upon the public highways may be a privilege or immunity of citizens of the United States. Compare Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 18 L. Ed. 745. A citizen may have, under the Fourteenth Amendment, the right to travel and transport his property upon them by auto vehicle. But he has no right to make the highways his place of business by using them as a common carrier for hire. Such use is a privilege which may be granted or withheld by the state in its discretion, without violating either the due process clause or the equal protection clause." Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925) found on page 2 in the Westlaw pdf 

"If the right of passing through a State by a citizen of the United States is one guaranteed to him by the Constitution, it must be as sacred from State taxation"....

‘Living as we do under a common government, charged with the great concerns of the whole Union, every citizen of the United States from the most remote States or territories, is entitled to free access, not only to the principal departments established at Washington, but also to its judicial tribunals and public offices in every State in the Union. . . . For all the great purposes for which the Federal government was formed we are one people, with one common country. *49 We are all citizens of the United States, and as members of the same community must have the right to pass and repass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States. And a tax imposed by a State, for entering its territories or harbors, is inconsistent with the rights which belong to citizens of other States as members of the Union, and with the objects which that Union was intended to attain. Such a power in the States could produce nothing but discord and mutual irritation, and they very clearly do not possess it.’ Crandall v. State of Nevada, 73 U.S. 35 (1867)

"The streets belong to the public and are primarily for the use of the public in the ordinary way. Their use for the purposes of gain is special and extraordinary, and, generally at least, may be prohibited or conditioned as the Legislature deems proper."....

"A distinction must be observed between the regulation of an activity which may be engaged in as matter of right, and one carried on by government sufferance or permission, since in the latter case the power to exclude altogether generally includes the lesser power to impose conditions, and may justify a degree of regulation not admissible in the former." Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140 (1924)

"First. It is well established law that the highways of the state are public property; that their primary and preferred use is for private purposes; and that their use for purposes of gain is special and extraordinary, which, generally at least, the legislature may prohibit or condition as it sees fit." Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1932)

"In all the states, from the beginning down to the adoption of the Articles of Confederation, the citizens thereof possessed the fundamental right, inherent in citizens of all free governments, peacefully to dwell within the limits of their respective states, to move at will from place to place therein, and to have free ingress thereto and egress therefrom, with a consequent authority in the states to forbid and punish violations of this fundamental right." U.S. v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281 (1920)

"Though I believe that ‘due process' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment includes all of the first eight Amendments, I do not think it is restricted and confined to them. We recently held that the undefined ‘liberty’ in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment includes freedom to travel. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125-127, 78 S.Ct. 1113, 1118—1119, 2 L.Ed.2d 1204. Cf. *517 Edwards v. People of State of California, 314 U.S. 160, 177, 178, 62 S.Ct. 164, 169, 86 L.Ed. 119 (concurring opinion)." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) 

"Right to interstate travel is right that Constitution itself guarantees and is constitutionally protected independent of Fourteenth Amendment....

Although the Articles of Confederation provided that ‘the people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State,'  that right finds no explicit mention in the Constitution. The reason, it has been suggested, is that a right so elementary was conceived from the beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created. In any event, freedom to travel throughout the United States has long been recognized as a basic right under the Constitution. See Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270,...

‘For all the great purposes for which the Federal government was formed, we are one people, with one common country. We are all citizens of the United States; and, as members of the same community, must have the right to pass and repass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States.’...Although there have been recurring differences in emphasis within the Court as to the source of the constitutional right of interstate travel, there is no need here to canvass those differences further.  All have agreed that the right exists. Its explicit recognition as one of the federal rights protected by what is now  U.S.C. s 241 goes back at least as far as 1904. United States v. Moore, C.C., 129 F. 630, 633. We reaffirm it now." U.S. v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966)

"It was undoubtedly the object of the clause in question to place the citizens of each State upon the same footing with citizens of other States, so far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in those States are concerned. It relieves them from the disabilities of alienage in other States; it inhibits discriminating legislation against them by other States; it gives them the right of free ingress into other States, and egress from them; it insures to them in other States the same freedom possessed by the citizens of those States in the acquisition and enjoyment of property and in the pursuit of happiness; and it secures to them in other States the equal protection of their laws. It has been justly said that no provision in the Constitution has tended so strongly to constitute the citizens of the United States one people as this." Paul v. State of Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1868)

"For more than a century, this Court has recognized the constitutional right of all citizens to unhindered interstate travel and settlement. Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 492, 12 L.Ed. 702 (1849) (Taney, C.J.); Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 43—44, 18 L.Ed. 744 (1868); Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 180, 19 L.Ed. 357 (1869); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 62 S.Ct. 164, 86 L.Ed. 119 (1941); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757—758, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 1177—1178, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629—631, 634, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328, 1329—1331, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969). From whatever constitutional provision this right may be said to flow,16 both its existence *238 and its fundamental importance to our Federal Union have long been established beyond question." Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970)

“Thus, among the rights and privileges of national citizenship recognized by this court are the right to pass freely from state to state (Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 18 L. ed. 745);” and “the right to enter the public lands (United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76, 28 L. ed. 673, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 35);” Twining v. State of N.J., 211 U.S. 78 (1908)

"And it is clear that the freedom to travel includes the ‘freedom to enter and abide in any State in the Union,’ id., at 285, 91 S.Ct., at 345. Obviously, durational residence laws single out the class of bona fide state and county residents who have recently exercised this constitutionally protected right, and penalize such travelers directly. We considered such a durational residence requirement in Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, where the pertinent statutes imposed a one-year waiting period for interstate migrants as a condition to receiving welfare benefits. Although in Shapiro we specifically did not decide whether durational residence requirements could be used to determine voting eligibility, *339 id., 394 U.S., at 638 n. 21, 89 S.Ct., at 1333, we concluded that since the right to travel was a constitutionally protected right, ‘any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional.’ Id., at 634, 89 S.Ct., at 1331. This compelling-state-interest test was also adopted in the separate concurrence of Mr. Justice Stewart. Preceded by a long line of cases recognizing the constitutional right to travel, and repeatedly reaffirmed in the face of attempts to disregard it, see Wyman v. Bowens, 397 U.S. 49, 90 S.Ct. 813, 25 L.Ed.2d 38 (1970), and Wyman v. Lopez, 404 U.S. 1055, 92 S.Ct. 736, 30 L.Ed.2d 743 (1972), Shapiro and the compelling-state-interest test it articulates control this case." Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972)

"The word “travel” is not found in the text of the Constitution. Yet the “constitutional right to travel from one State to another” is firmly embedded in our jurisprudence. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966). Indeed, as Justice Stewart reminded us in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969), the right is so important that it is “assertable against private interference as well as governmental action ... a virtually unconditional personal right, guaranteed by the Constitution to us all.” Id., at 643, 89 S.Ct. 1322 (concurring opinion). In Shapiro, we reviewed the constitutionality of three statutory provisions that denied welfare assistance to residents of Connecticut, the District of Columbia, and Pennsylvania, who had resided within those respective jurisdictions less than one year immediately preceding their applications for assistance. Without pausing to identify the specific source of the right, we began by noting that the Court had long “recognized that the nature of our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.” Id., at 629, 89 S.Ct. 1322." Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999)

“The court held it unconstitutional, saying: ‘The right to follow any lawful vocation and to make contracts is as completely within the protection of the Constitution as the right to hold property free from unwarranted seizure, or the liberty  to go when and where one will.” Coppage v. State of Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915)   

"We recently held that the undefined ‘liberty’ in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment includes freedom to travel.” Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961)

“The right of interstate travel has repeatedly been recognized as a basic constitutional freedom.“ Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974)

"The activity licensed by state DMVs and in connection with which individuals must submit personal information to the DMV—the operation of motor vehicles—is itself integrally related to interstate commerce." Seth Waxman, Solicitor General U.S. Department of Justice BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS *  Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000)  Found on page 10 in the Westlaw pdf 

"On the other hand, as the United States recognizes, the freedom to loiter for innocent purposes is part of the “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.19 We have expressly identified this “right to remove from one place to another according to inclination” as “an attribute of personal liberty” protected by the Constitution. Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274, 21 S.Ct. 128, 45 L.Ed. 186 (1900); see also Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972).20 *54 Indeed, it is apparent **1858 that an individual's decision to remain in a public place of his choice is as much a part of his liberty as the freedom of movement inside frontiers that is “a part of our heritage” Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126, 78 S.Ct. 1113, 2 L.Ed.2d 1204 (1958), or the right to move “to whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct” identified in Blackstone's Commentaries. 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 130 (1765).21" City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999)

“A state law implicates the right to travel when it actually deters such travel, see, e.g., Crandall v. Nevada, supra, at 46; see also Shapiro, supra 394 U.S., at 629, 89 S.Ct., at 1328, when impeding travel is its primary objective, see Zobel, supra 457 U.S., at 62, n. 9, 102 S.Ct., at 2314, n. 9; Shapiro, supra 394 U.S., at 628–631, 89 S.Ct., at 1328– 1329, or when it uses “ ‘any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right.’  ” Dunn, supra 405 U.S., at 340, 92 S.Ct., at 1002 (quoting Shapiro, supra 394 U.S., at 634, 89 S.Ct., at 1331). 

“ Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986) “The textual source of the constitutional right to travel, or, more precisely, the right of free interstate migration, though, has proved elusive. It has been variously assigned to the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, see, e.g., Zobel, supra 457 U.S., at 71, 102 S.Ct., at 2318 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment), to the Commerce Clause, see Edwards v. California, 314 U.S., at 173–174, 62 S.Ct., at 166–167, and to the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see, e.g., id., at 177–178, 62 S.Ct., at 168–169 (Douglas, J., concurring). The right has also been inferred from the federal structure of government adopted by our Constitution.” Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986)

“For all the great purposes for which the Federal government was formed, we are one people, with one common country. We are all citizens of the United States; and, as members of the same community, must have the right to pass and repass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States. And a tax imposed by a State for entering its territories or harbours is inconsistent with the rights which belong to the citizens of other States as members of the Union, and with the objects which that Union was intended to attain. Such a power in the States could produce nothing but discord and mutual irritation, and they very clearly do not possess it.” Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283 (1849) Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 492, 12 L.Ed. 702 (1849) (Taney, C.J.) Found on page 108 in Westlaw pdf

“Similarly, cases involving the right to travel have consistently held that statutes penalizing the fundamental right to travel must pass muster under the compelling-state-interest test, irrespective of whether the statutes actually deter travel. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 257-258, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 1081-1082, 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 339-341, 92 S.Ct. 995, 1001-1002, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969).” Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) 

‘As we have made clear in Shapiro and subsequent cases, any classification that penalizes exercise of the constitutional right to travel is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling governmental interest. As recently as last Term we held that the right to travel requires that States provide the same vital governmental benefits and privileges to recent immigrants that they do to long-time residents. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 261, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 1083, 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974)”  Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975)

“Without further laboring the point, I think it is clear beyond cavil that the right to seek dissolution of the marital relationship is of such fundamental importance that denial of this right to the class of recent interstate travelers penalizes interstate travel within the meaning of Shapiro, Dunn, and Maricopa County. ….But whatever the ultimate resting point of the current readjustments in equal protection analysis, the Court has clearly directed that the proper standard to apply to cases in which state statutes have penalized the exercise of the right to interstate travel is the ‘compelling interest’ test. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S., at 634, 638, 89 S.Ct. at 1331, 1333; Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 238, 91 S.Ct. 260, 321—322, 27 L.Ed.2d 272 (1970) (opinion of Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ.); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S., at 342 —343, 92 S.Ct. 995, at 1003—1004, 31 L.Ed.2d 274; Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S., at 262—263, 94 S.Ct. at 1084—1085.“ Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975)

“The Court of Appeals' conclusion that § 74-9902 is constitutionally invalid rests entirely on the premise that the statute impairs the fundamental right of every Georgia resident to travel from Georgia to another State.11 It is, of *418 course, well settled that the right of a United States citizen to travel from one State to another and to take up residence in the State of his choice is protected by the Federal Constitution. Although the textual source of this right has been the subject of debate, its fundamental nature has consistently been recognized by this Court. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-631, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328-1330, 22 L.Ed.2d 600; United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-759, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 1177-1179, 16 L.Ed.2d 239. The right to travel has been described as a privilege of national citizenship, 12 and as an aspect of liberty that is protected by the Due **2440 Process Clauses of the Fifth *419 and Fourteenth Amendments. Whatever its source, a State may neither tax nor penalize a citizen for exercising his right to leave one State and enter another.” Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412 (1981) 

“Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 29 L.Ed.2d 338, upheld the application of § 1985(3) to purely private conspiracies aimed at interfering with rights *826 constitutionally protected against private as well as official encroachment, such as the rights involved in that case—the right to travel and Thirteenth Amendment Rights.” United Broth. of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local..., 463 U.S. 825 (1983)

“Our cases have firmly established that the right of interstate travel is constitutionally protected, does not necessarily rest on the Fourteenth Amendment, and is assertable against private as well as governmental interference. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629—631, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328—1330, 22 L.Ed.2d 600; id., at 642—644, 89 S.Ct., at 1335—1336 (concurring opinion); *106 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757—760 and n. 17, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 1177—1180, 16 L.Ed.2d 239; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97, 29 S.Ct. 14, 18, 53 L.Ed. 97; Slaughter- House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 79—80, 21 L.Ed. 394; Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 44, 48—49, 18 L.Ed. 744; Passenger Cases (Smith v. Turner), 7 How. 283, 492, 12 L.Ed. 702 (Taney, C.J., dissenting). The ‘right to pass freely from state to state’ has been explicitly recognized as ‘among the rights and privileges of national citizenship.’ Twining v. New Jersey, supra, 211 U.S., at 97, 29 S.Ct., at 19. That right, like other rights of national citizenship, is within the power of Congress to protect by appropriate legislation. E.g., United States v. Guest, supra, 383 U.S., at 759, 86 S.Ct., at 1178; United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 314—315, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 1037—1038, 85 L.Ed. 1368; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 4 S.Ct. 152, 28 L.Ed. 274; Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 285—287, 91 S.Ct. 260, 345—346, 27 L.Ed.2d 272 (concurring and dissenting opinion).” Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971) 

"Such difficulties indicate that the dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a false one. Property does not have rights. People have rights. The right to enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to speak or the right to travel, is, in truth, a "personal" right, whether the "property" in question be a welfare check, a home, or a savings account. In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty and the personal right in property. Neither could have meaning without the other. That rights in property are basic civil rights has long been recognized. J. Locke, Of Civil Government 82-85 (1924); J. Adams, A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America, in F. Coker, Democracy, Liberty, and Property 121-132 (1942); 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *138-140. Congress recognized these rights in 1871 when it enacted the predecessor of §§ 1983 and 1343(3). We do no more than reaffirm the judgment of Congress today." Lynch v. Household Financial Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972)

" ‘Personal liberty consists,’ says Blackstone, ‘in the power of locomotion, of changing situation, or removing one's person to whatever place one's own inclination may direct, without restraint, unless by due course of law.’ " Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) 

“While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) 

SUPPLEMENTAL U.S. CASE EXCERPTS

"Persons faced with an unconstitutional licensing law which purports to require a license as a prerequisite to exercise of right... may ignore the law and engage with impunity in exercise of such right." Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham 394 U.S. 147 (1969)

"Ordinance which makes peaceful enjoyment of freedoms guaranteed by Constitution contingent upon uncontrolled will of an official, as by requiring a permit or license which may be granted or withheld in official's discretion, is an unconstitutional censorship or private restraint upon enjoyment of such freedoms" Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham 394 U.S. 147 (1969)

"A state may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the federal constitution." Murdock v. Com. of Pennsylvania 319 U.S. 105 (1943)

 "It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the Constitutional rights of the citizen and against any stealthy encroachments thereon." Boyd vs. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) 

"Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491. (1966) 

"...the assertion of Federal rights, when plainly and reasonably made, is not to be defeated under the name of local practice." Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22 (1923)

"to punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort" United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (1982)

"Police power does not justify any act which violates prohibitions of state or federal Constitutions." Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. State Highway..., 294 U.S. 613 (1935) 

“Where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit, or action at law, whenever that right is invaded”, Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803).

“The [Supreme] Court has found unfit for adjudication any cause that "is not in any real sense adversary," that "does not assume the `honest and actual antagonistic assertion of rights' to be adjudicated…” Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961)

 “Standing represents a jurisdictional requirement which remains open to review at all stages of the litigation.” National Organization for Women, Inc., v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994)  

“the duty of this court, as of every judicial tribunal, is limited to determining rights of persons or of property, which are actually controverted in the particular case before it.” Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 179 U.S. 405, 21 SCt. 206, 208 (1900)

"In determining whether such rights were denied we are governed by the substance of things, and not by mere form. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Schmidt, 177 U. S. 230, 44 L. ed. 747, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 230". Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427 (1901)

"The courts are not bound by mere forms, nor are they to be misled by mere pretenses. They are at liberty, indeed, are under a solemn duty, to look at the substance of things, whenever they enter upon the inquiry whether the legislature has transcended the limits of its authority. If, therefore, a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to those objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the constitution." Mulger vs. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887)

“The federal constitution being intended as a rule for the courts as well as the legislature, the courts will take judicial notice of its provisions.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803)