FEDERAL COMMERCE POWER

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U.S. CONSTITUTION - The Commerce Clause, also known as 'the grant' because it is a grant of authority delegated from the constitution to the U.S. Congress.

U.S. Const. Article I, Section 8, Clause 3:

To regulate commerce with the foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes;...

“The Commerce Clause is a grant of authority to Congress, and not a restriction on the authority of that body. See American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 67 S.Ct. 133, 91 L.Ed. 103 (1946); Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824).” White v. Massachusetts Council of Const. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983) 

"Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution delegates to the Congress the authority to regulate interstate commerce. And it is settled beyond question that the transportation of persons is ‘commerce’, within the meaning of that provision." Edwards v. People of State of California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941)

"Congress has the exclusive power to regulate interstate commerce is beyond question, and when that authority is exerted by the state, even in the just exercise of the police power, it may not interfere with the supreme authority of Congress over the subject; while this is true, this court from the beginning has recognized that there may be legitimate action by the state in the matter of local regulation, which the state may take until Congress exercises its authority upon the subject. This subject has been so frequently dealt with in decisions of this court that an extended review of the authorities is unnecessary. See the Minnesota Rate Cases (Simpson v. Shepard) 230 U. S. 352, 57 L. ed. 1511, 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1151, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 729."  Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52 (1915)

“It is impossible to see any distinction in its effect upon commerce of either class, between a statute which regulates the charges for transportation, and a statute which levies a tax for the benefit of the State upon the same transportation; and, in fact, the judgment of the court in the State Freight Tax Case, 15 Wall. 232, rested upon the ground that the tax was always added to the cost of transportation, and thus was a tax upon the privilege of carrying the goods through the State.”  Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. State of Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886)

"Consistent with this structure, we have identified three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power. Perez, supra, at 150, 91 S.Ct., at 1359; see also Hodel, supra, at 276–277, 101 S.Ct., at 2360–2361. First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce. See, e.g., Darby, 312 U.S., at 114, 61 S.Ct., at 457; Heart of Atlanta Motel, supra, at 256, 85 S.Ct., at 357 (“ ‘[T]he authority of Congress to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses has been frequently sustained, and is no longer open to question.’ ” (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491, 37 S.Ct. 192, 197, 61 L.Ed. 442 (1917))). Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities. See, e.g., Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342, 34 S.Ct. 833, 58 L.Ed. 1341 (1914); Southern R. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20, 32 S.Ct. 2, 56 L.Ed. 72 (1911) (upholding amendments to Safety Appliance Act as applied to vehicles used in intrastate commerce); Perez, supra, at 150, 91 S.Ct., at 1359 (“[F]or example, the destruction of an aircraft (18 U.S.C. § 32), or ... thefts from interstate shipments (18 U.S.C. § 659)”). Finally, Congress' commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities *559 having a substantial **1630 relation to interstate commerce, Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S., at 37, 57 S.Ct., at 624, i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce, Wirtz, supra, at 196, n. 27, 88 S.Ct., at 2024, n. 27. These examples are by no means exhaustive, but the pattern is clear. Where economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained." U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)

"Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258, 85 S.Ct. 348, 358, 13 L.Ed.2d 258, applying the settled principle expressed in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118, 61 S.Ct. 451, 459, 85 L.Ed. 609, that the power of Congress over interstate commerce ‘extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end * * *.’ " U.S. v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966)

"Congress may regulate intrastate activity that has a “substantial effect” on interstate commerce); Wickard, supra, at 125, 63 S.Ct., at 89 (Congress may regulate activity that “exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce”)" U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)

“We do not say that a case may not arise in which it will be found that a State, under the form of regulating its own affairs, has encroached upon the exclusive domain of Congress in respect to interstate commerce…”  Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. State of Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886)

 “But we think it may safely be said that State legislation which seeks to impose a direct burden upon interstate commerce, or to interfere directly with its freedom, does encroach upon the exclusive power of Congress.” Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. State of Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886)

"The states have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by congress to carry into effect the powers vested in the national government." M'Culloch v. State, 17 U.S. 316 (1819)

"The conclusion that the right of free movement is a right of national citizenship stands on firm historical ground. If a state tax on that movement, as in the Crandall case, is invalid, a fortiori a state statute which obstructs or in substance prevents that movement must fall." Edwards v. People of State of California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) 

"A state may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the federal constitution." Murdock v. Com. of Pennsylvania 319 U.S. 105 (1943)  

"It is also well settled in our decisions that the federal commerce power authorizes Congress to legislate for the protection of individuals from violations of civil rights that impinge on their free movement in interstate commerce. Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80, 61 S.Ct. 873, 85 L.Ed. 1201; Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816, 70 S.Ct. 843, 94 L.Ed. 1302; **1179 Boynton v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 364 U.S. 454, 81 S.Ct. 182, 5 L.Ed.2d 206; Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 85 S.Ct. 348, 13 L.Ed.2d 258; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 85 S.Ct. 377, 13 L.Ed.2d 290.....

Although there have been recurring differences in emphasis within the Court as to the source of the constitutional right of interstate travel, there is no need here to canvass those differences further. 16 All have agreed that the right exists. Its explicit recognition as one of the federal rights protected by what is now 18 U.S.C. s 241 goes back at least as far as 1904. United States v. Moore, C.C., 129 F. 630, 633. We reaffirm it now. 17" U.S. v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966)

Interstate travel substantially affects interstate commerce see Perez v. U.S., 402 U.S. 146 (1971) "In a companion case, Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 85 S.Ct. 377, 13 L.Ed.2d 290, we ruled on the constitutionality of the restaurant provision of the same Civil Rights Act which regulated the restaurant ‘if * * * it serves or offers to serve interstate travelers or a substantial portion of the food which it serves * * * has moved in commerce.’ Id., at 298, 85 S.Ct., at 381." And see Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), & Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241 (1964).

“…Thus it is plain that the right of free ingress and egress rises to a higher constitutional dignity than that afforded by state citizenship.” Edwards v. People of State of California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) 

“Congress may pass all laws which are necessary and proper for giving the most complete effect to this power. Still, the general jurisdiction over the place, subject to this grant of power, adheres to the territory, as a portion of sovereignty not yet given away.”  U.S. v. Bevans, 16 U.S. 336 (1818)

"The grant of the power of regulation to the Congress necessarily implies the subordination of the states to that power." Milk Control Board of Pennsylvania v. Eisenberg Farm Products, 306 U.S. 346 (1939)

“…the grant [the commerce clause] established the immunity of interstate commerce from the control of the States respecting all those subjects embraced within the grant which are of such a nature as to demand that, if regulated at all, their regulation must be prescribed by a single authority.” Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg Farm Products, 306 U.S. 346, 351.

“And if it be a regulation of commerce, …it must be of that national character, and the regulation can only appropriately exist by general rules and principles, which demand that it should be done by the Congress of the United States under the commerce clause of the Constitution.”   Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. State of Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886)

There would otherwise be no security against conflicting regulations of different States, each discriminating in favor of its own products and citizens, and against the products and citizens of other States. And it is a matter of public history that the object of vesting in Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the States was to insure uniformity of regulation against conflicting and discriminating State legislation. Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691 (1880)

"The uniformity of commercial regulations, which the grant to Congress was designed to secure against conflicting State provisions, was necessarily intended only for cases where such uniformity is practicable." Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691 (1880)

"It follows that no form of state activity can constitutionally thwart the regulatory power granted by the commerce clause to Congress. Hence the reach of that power extends to those intrastate activities which in a substantial way interfere with or obstruct the exercise of the granted power." U.S. v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942)

"Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution delegates to the Congress the authority to regulate interstate commerce. And it is settled beyond question that the transportation of persons is ‘commerce’, within the meaning of that provision." Edwards v. People of State of California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) 

LEGAL DEFINITIONS:

Transportation. The movement of goods or persons from one place to another, by a carrier. Interstate Commerce Com'n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 14S.Ct. 1125, 38 L.E.d 1047 (1894) Black's Law Dictionary 6th Ed. p. 1499 

Carrier. Individual or organization of engaged in the transportation of passengers or goods for hire.  Black's Law Dictionary 6th Ed. p.214

Common carrier. A commercial enterprise that holds itself out to the public as offering to transport freight or passengers for a fee. A common carrier is generally required by law to transport freight or passengers or freight, without refusal, if the approved fare or charge is paid. - Also termed public carrier. [Cases: Carriers West 4.] "[A] 'common carrier' is bond to take all goods of the kind which he usually carries, unless his conveyance is full, or the goods be specifically dangerous; but may charge different rates to different customers." Thomas E. Holland, The elements of Jurisprudence 299 (13th ed. 1924). Black's Law Dictionary 8th Ed. p.226

Interstate commerce. Traffic, intercourse, commercial trading, or the transportation of persons or property between or among the several stated of the Union, or from or between points in one state and points in another state;  commerce between two states, or between places lying in different states. Gibbons v. Orden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 6 L.Ed. 23; Wabash,etc. R. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 7 S.Ct. 4, 30 L.Ed. 244. It comprehends all the component parts of commercial intercourse between different states. Furst v. Brewster, 282 U.S. 493, 51 S.Ct. 295, 296, 75 L.Ed. 478. See Balancing of interests.  Black's Law Dictionary 6th Ed. p. 819

Interstate Commerce Act. The act of congress of February 4, 1887 (49 U.S.C.A. § 10101 et seq.), designed to regulate commerce between the states, and particularly the transportation of persons and property, by carriers, between interstate points. Black's Law Dictionary 6th Ed. p. 819

 Preemption. Doctrine adopted by U.S. Supreme Court holding that certain matters are of such a national, as opposed to local, character that federal law preempt or take precedence over state laws. As such, a state may not pass a law inconsistent with the federal law. Examples are federal laws governing interstate commerce. See also Federal pre-emption; Supremacy clause. Black's Law Dictionary 6th Ed. P.1177 

Federal Definition of 'Driver'  from the U.S. DOT - Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration

https://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/regulations/title49/part/383 Scroll down to Question #17  just below is the definition of driver as we have verbatim below:

'Driver means any person who operates a Commercial Motor Vehicle (CMV).'

Now let's look at Black's Law Dictionary to see what this secondary source of law defines the word 'DRIVER' as:

DRIVER.  One employed in conducting or operating a coach, carriage, wagon, or other vehicle, with horses, mules, or other animals, or a bicycle, tricycle, or motor car, though not a street railroad car.   A person actually doing driving, whether employed by owner to drive or driving his own vehicle.  Wallace v. Woods, 340 Mo. 452, 102 S.W.2d 91, 97. Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th Ed. Revised 1968, p. 585 

"Under our federal system, the “ ‘States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law.’ ” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1720, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1572, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982)); see also Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 109, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 1039, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945) (plurality opinion) (“Our national government is one of delegated powers alone. Under our federal system the administration of criminal justice rests with the States except as Congress, acting within the scope of those delegated powers, has created offenses against the United States”)."  U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)

U.S.C. TITLE 18- CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE PART 1 CHAPTER 2 SECTION 31. DEFINITIONS

(6) Motor vehicle.—The term “motor vehicle” means every description of carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes on the highways in the transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or property or cargo.

(10) Used for commercial purposes.—The term "used for commercial purposes" means the carriage of persons or property for any fare, fee, rate, charge or other consideration, or directly or indirectly in connection with any business, or other undertaking intended for profit.

https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title18/part1/chapter2&edition=prelim

The defendant has not raised the issue of sovereign immunity on this appeal. In Board of Trustees of Arkansas A & M College v. Davis, 396 F.2d 730 (8th Cir. 1968), this Court reaffirmed the principle that state officials are not immune from suit when they transcend their lawful authority by invading constitutional rights. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Emp.,..., 406 F.2d 137 (1969) 

"To them may be added the case of W. W. Cargill Co. v. Minnesota, 180 U.S. 452, 468, where it was held that "the acceptance of a license, in whatever form, will not impose upon the licensee an obligation to respect or to comply with any provisions of the statute . . . that are repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.", "Power Manufacturing Company v. Saunders, 274 U.S. 490 (1927). 

Federal Legislation on Interstate Commerce codified in the United States Code (U.S.C.):

49 U.S.C. SUBTITLE VI - MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS

PART B - COMMERCIAL

CHAPTER 313 - COMMERCIAL MOTOR VEHICLE OPERATORS

§ 31301. Definitions.  

In this chapter - 

(2) "commerce" means trade, traffic, and transportation—

(A) in the jurisdiction of the United States between a place in a State and a place outside that State (including a place outside the United States); or

(B) in the United States that affects trade, traffic, and transportation described in subclause (A) of this clause.

(3) "commercial driver's license" means a license issued by a State to an individual authorizing the individual to operate a class of commercial motor vehicles. 

(6) "driver's license" means a license issued by a State to an individual authorizing the individual to operate a motor vehicle on highways. 

(11) "motor vehicle" means a vehicle, machine, tractor, trailer, or semitrailer propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used on public streets, roads, or highways, but does not include a vehicle, machine, tractor, trailer, or semitrailer operated only on a rail line or custom harvesting farm machinery.  

 TITLE 49 U.S.C. TRANSPORTATION SUBTITLE III CHAPTER 51 § 5102. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2011-title49/pdf/USCODE-2011-title49.pdf    

Definitions In this chapter—

(1) “commerce” means trade or transportation in the jurisdiction of the United States—

(13) “transports” or “transportation” means the movement of property and loading, unloading, or storage incidental to the movement.

Title 23 Highways U.S.C. Chapter 1 Sect. 1  

https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2010-title23/html/USCODE-2010-title23.htm

(11) Highway.—The term “highway” includes—

(A) a road, street, and parkway;

(B) a right-of-way, bridge, railroad-highway crossing, tunnel, drainage structure, sign, guardrail, and protective structure, in connection with a highway; and

(C) a portion of any interstate or international bridge or tunnel and the approaches thereto, the cost of which is assumed by a State transportation department, including such facilities as may be required by the United States Customs and Immigration Services in connection with the operation of an international bridge or tunnel.

(25) Public lands highway.—The term “public lands highway” means a forest road under the jurisdiction of and maintained by a public authority and open to public travel or any highway through unappropriated or unreserved public lands, nontaxable Indian lands, or other Federal reservations under the jurisdiction of and maintained by a public authority and open to public travel.

(27) Public road.—The term “public road” means any road or street under the jurisdiction of and maintained by a public authority and open to public travel.

https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/Interstate_Commerce_Act_Is_Passed.htm 

https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artI-S8-C3-1/ALDE_00013403/

https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/article-1/section-8/clause-3/