Cases Against the Right to Travel

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This page is dedicated to cases that are against the right to travel or that are not actually against the right but are used against the right to travel by prosecutors and judges. This page exists to show that we (publicvehicualrtravel.com) are unbiased and have nothing to hide regarding the truth of the law. Some of the cases appear to be damning evidence against the right to travel without a license but the truth is there is no damning evidence against the right to travel without a driver's license here nor anywhere else.

These cases are often used by prosecutors and courts to rule against pro se litigants asserting their constitutionally protected right to travel.

CASE EXCERPTS: 

“In the absence of national legislation covering the subject, a state may rightfully prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public safety and order in respect to the operation upon its highways of all motor vehicles,-those moving in interstate commerce as well as others. And to this end it may require the registration of such vehicles and the licensing of their drivers, charging therefor reasonable fees graduated according to the horse-power of the engines,-a practical measure of size, speed, and difficulty of control. This is but an exercise of the police power uniformly recognized as belonging to the states and essential to the preservation of the health, safety, and comfort of their citizens; and it does not constitute a direct and material burden on interstate commerce. The reasonableness of the state's action is always subject to *623 inquiry in so far as it affects interstate commerce, and in that regard it is likewise subordinate to the will of Congress. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 30, 31, 28 L. ed. 923-925, 5 Sup.Ct. Rep. 357; Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, 480, 31 L. ed. 508, 513, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 804, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 564; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 136, 38 L. ed. 385, 388, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 499; New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. New York, 165 U. S. 628, 631, 41 L. ed. 853, 854, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 392, 42 L. ed. 780, 791, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285, 298, 43 L. ed. 702, 707, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 465; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, 568, 55 L. ed. 328, 338, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 259; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Georgia, 234 U. S. 280, 291, 58 L. ed. 1312, 1317, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 829."  Hendrick v. State of Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1915) Found on page 3 in the Westlaw PDF download below

“Motor vehicles are dangerous machines, and, even when skillfully and carefully operated, their use is attended by serious dangers to persons and property. In the public interest the state may make and enforce regulations reasonable calculated to promote care on the part of all, residents and nonresidents alike, who use its highways.” Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927)

“First. The statute, leaving out of consideration the amendments, is not obnoxious to the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. The use of the public highways by motor vehicles, with its consequent dangers, renders the reasonableness and necessity of regulation apparent. The universal practice is to register ownership of automobiles and to license their drivers. Any appropriate means adopted by the states to insure competence and care  on the part of its licensees and to protect others using the highway is consonant with due process.” Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941) Found on page 3 in Westlaw

“At most, their argument reduces to the feeble claim that passengers have a constitutional right to the most convenient form of travel. That notion, as any experienced traveler can attest, finds no support whatsoever in Shapiro or in the airlines' own schedules.” City of Houston v. F. A. A., 679 F.2d 1184 (1982) 5th Cir. Court. of Appeals Found on Page 12 in Westlaw

"The plaintiff's argument that the right to operate a motor vehicle is fundamental because of its relation to the fundamental right of interstate travel is utterly frivolous. The plaintiff is not being prevented from traveling interstate by public transportation, by common carrier, or in a motor vehicle driven by someone with a license to drive it. What is at issue here is not his right to travel interstate, but his right to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways, we have no hesitation on holding that this is not a fundamental right." Berberian v. Petit, 118 R.I. 448 (1977) 

“Miller contends that his right to interstate travel encompasses a fundamental right to drive a car. 

[3] We have previously held that burdens on a single mode of transportation do not implicate the right to interstate travel. See Monarch Travel Servs., Inc. v. Associated Cultural Clubs, Inc., 466 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir.1972) (“A rich man can choose *1206 to drive a limousine; a poor man may have to walk. The poor man's lack of choice in his mode of travel may be unfortunate, but it is not unconstitutional.”); City of Houston v. FAA, 679 F.2d 1184, 1198 (5th Cir.1982) (“At most, [the air carrier plaintiffs'] argument reduces to the feeble claim that passengers have a constitutional right to the most convenient form of travel. That notion, as any experienced traveler can attest, finds no support whatsoever in [the Supreme Court's right of interstate travel jurisprudence] or in the airlines' own schedules.”). The Supreme Court of Rhode Island in Berberian v. Petit, 118 R.I. 448, 374 A.2d 791 (1977), put it this way: 

The plaintiff's argument that the right to operate a motor vehicle is fundamental because of its relation to the fundamental right of interstate travel is utterly frivolous. The plaintiff is not being prevented from traveling interstate by public transportation, by common carrier, or in a motor vehicle driven by someone with a license to drive it. What is at issue here is not his right to travel interstate, but his right to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways, and we have no hesitation in holding that this is not a fundamental right. 374 A.2d at 794 (citations and footnotes omitted).
Miller does not have a fundamental “right to drive.” In Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112–16, 97 S.Ct. 1723, 52 L.Ed.2d 172 (1977), the Supreme Court held that a state could summarily suspend or revoke the license of a motorist who had been repeatedly convicted of traffic offenses with due process satisfied by a full administrative hearing available only after the suspension or revocation had taken place. The Court conspicuously did not afford the possession of a driver's license the weight of a fundamental right. See also Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 10, 99 S.Ct. 2612, 61 L.Ed.2d 321 (1979); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539, 542–43, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971). In sum, Miller does not have a fundamental right to drive a motor vehicle, and the DMV did not unconstitutionally impede his right to interstate travel by denying him a driver's license.” Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 1999)

"Some people believe with great fervor preposterous things that just happen to coincide with their self-interest...The government may not prohibit the holding of these beliefs, but it may penalize people who act on them." Coleman v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 791 F.2d 69 (7th Cir. 1986) 

"It requires something more than ingenious and pleasing argument to convince us that the state is powerless to maintain her dignity and enforce her laws as against any individual within her boundaries, no matter what his status may be as to citizenship or lack of it." State Ex rel. Best v. Superior Court, 107 Wash. 238 (1919)

"There is no constitutional right to a particular mode of travel. The right to travel is not being denied. The defendants are being prohibited from using a particular mode of travel in a particular way, due to their repeated offenses, in order to protect the public at large which we find to be reasonable *881 under the circumstances. See Eggert v. Seattle,81 Wash.2d 840, 505 P.2d 801 (1973), for a discussion of the right to travel."  State v. Scheffel, 82 Wash.2d 872 (1973) 

"The privilege to operate an automobile is a valuable one and may not be unreasonably or arbitrarily taken away; however, the enjoyment of the privilege depends upon compliance with the conditions prescribed by the law and is always subject to such reasonable regulation and control as the legislature may see fit to impose under the police power in the interest of public safety and welfare. See Anderson v. Commissioner of Highways, Supra." State v. Scheffel, 82 Wash.2d 872 (1973) 

“Hence, driving an automobile on our state's public highways is a privilege and not a right because the activity is limited to a certain class of individuals, generally those over the age of 16 years, who have passed a driver's license examination. RCW 46.20.031; .120.2 This privilege is always subject to such *276 reasonable regulation and control as the proper authorities see fit to impose under the police power in the interest of public safety and welfare. See State v. Scheffel, 82 Wash.2d 872, 880, 514 P.2d 1052 (1973) (one does not have an absolute constitutional right to a particular mode of travel); **947 Crossman v. Department of Licensing, 42 Wash.App. 325, 328 n. 2, 711 P.2d 1053 (1985) (privilege to drive not a “fundamental right”); State ex rel. Juckett v. Evergreen Dist. Ct., 32 Wash.App. 49, 55, 645 P.2d 734 (1982) (driver's license is privilege granted by State). This is because the right to a particular mode of travel is no more than an aspect of the “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.3 See Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33, 62 S.Ct. 24, 86 L.Ed. 21 (1941). In Reitz, the United States Supreme Court examined the privilege to travel on our public streets and highways and concluded, at 314 U.S. 36, 62 S.Ct. 26–27: 

Any appropriate means adopted by the states to insure competence and care on the part of its licensees and to protect others using the highway is consonant with due process. See also, Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 35 S.Ct. 140, 59 L.Ed. 385 (1915) (states may rightfully prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public safety and order in the operation upon its highways of motor vehicles and, it may require the licensing of drivers).  Here, RCW 46.20.021 requires a license to drive or operate a motor vehicle upon our state highways. Licensing is a means by which the state may determine whether vehicle operators have acquired a minimal standard of competence. Mandating driver competence is a public purpose *277 within the police power of the state because it furthers the interests of public safety and welfare. It is designed to improve the safety of our highways and to protect and enhance the well-being of the residents and visitors of our state. RCW 46.01.011; 46.20.021. This is a reasonable and justifiable exercise of the police power." Spokane v. Port, 43 Wn. App. 273 (1986)

 “A rich man can choose to drive a limousine; a poor man may have to walk. The poor man's lack of choice in his mode of travel may be unfortunate, but it is not unconstitutional.” Monarch Travel Services, Inc. v. Associated Cultural Clubs, Inc., 466 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1972 

CASE CITATIONS:

1. Hendrick v. State of Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1915) 

2. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) 

3. Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941) 

4. City of Houston v. FAA, 679 F.2d 1184, 1198 (5th Cir. 1982) 

5. Berberian v. Petit,  118 R.I. 448 (1977)

6. Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 1999)

7. Coleman v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 791 F.2d 69 (7th Cir. 1986)

8. State Ex rel. Best v. Superior Court, 107 Wash. 238 (1919) 

9. State v. Scheffel, 82 Wash.2d 872 (1973)

10. Spokane v. Port, 43 Wn. App. 273 (1986)

11. Monarch Travel Servs., Inc. v. Associated Cultural Clubs, Inc., 466 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir. 1972)

STATEMENTS AND ARGUMENTS MADE BY JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS:

"We're not violating your right to travel, no one is stopping you from traveling, you can walk, ride a bicycle, or pay someone with a driver's license to drive you..."

False argument to beat Right2travel assertions: “You buy gas so you were engaged in commerce”.