State Supreme Ct. and State Appellate Ct. Cases

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Every excerpt on this page is from a real case, either from a state supreme court or a state court of appeals. Each case excerpt found on this page is an exact quote (verbatim) taken from the cases cited. The cases are available to all for free at the bottom of the page in pdf format so anyone can read the whole case for themselves, read the case excerpts and then the entire case to get the full context of each case.

"The streets are provided for the public in general for purposes of travel and transportation" Dresser v. City of Wichita, 96 Kan. 820 (1915).

'It will be observed that the statute says that a highway, within the contemplation of the act, is, "Every way or place of whatever nature open as a matter of right to the use of the public for the purposes of vehicular travel." There can be no question but that this definition is broad enough to include streets in incorporated cities, because they are open as a matter of right to the use of the public for the purposes  of vehicular travel." Neeley v. Bock, 184 Wash. 135, 143 (1935). (Also found in the Washington Reports Volume 164 Remington 1935 on page 140).

"Based upon the fundamental ground that the sovereign state has the plenary control of the streets and highways in the exercise of its police power, it may absolutely prohibit the use of the streets as a place for the prosecution of a private business for gain.  They all recognize the fundamental distinction between the ordinary Right of the Citizen to use the streets in the usual way and the use of the streets as a place of business or a main instrumentality of business for private gain.  The former is a common Right, the latter is an extraordinary use."  Hadfield v. Lundin, 98 Wash. 657 (1917).

"Indeed, a citizen may have, under the federal Constitution, a right to travel and to transport his property upon the highways by motor vehicle; but he has no right to make the highways his place of business by using them *1013 as a common carrier for hire. Buck v. Kuykendall, supra. 

Such use is a privilege which may be granted or withheld by the state in its discretion without violating any provision of the state or federal Constitution. The highways belong to the public, but are primarily for the use of the public in the ordinary way. Their use for the purposes of private gain is special and extraordinary and, in general, may be restrained, prohibited, or conditioned as the legislative power may prescribe. 

Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140, 44 S. Ct. 257, 68 L. Ed. 596; Clark v. Poor, 274 U. S. 554, 47 S. Ct. 702, 71 L. Ed. 1199; Frost v. Railroad Commission, supra." Slusher v. Safety Coach Transit Co., 229 Ky. 731 (1929)

"The right of a citizen to travel on the public highways and to transport his property thereon, either by horse drawn carriage or wagon or automobile, is not a mere privilege which a city may permit or prohibit at will, but a common Right which he has under his right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Thompson vs. Smith, 155 Va 367, 154 SE 579, 71 ALR 604 (1930).

"The right of a citizen to travel upon the highway and transport his property thereon, in the ordinary course of life and business, differs radically and obviously from that of one who makes the highway his place of business and uses it for private gain, in the running of a stage coach or omnibus. The former is the usual and ordinary right of a citizen, a common right, a right common to all,  while the latter is special, unusual, and extraordinary." Ex parte Dickey, 76 W.Va. 576 (1915) Found on page 6 in Westlaw pdf below

As to the former, the extent of legislative power is that of regulation; but, as to the latter, its power is broader. The right may be wholly denied, or it may be permitted to some and denied to others, because of its extraordinary nature. This distinction, elementary and fundamental in character, is recognized by all the authorities: “A distinction must be made between the general use, which all of the public are permitted to make of the street for ordinary purposes, and the special and peculiar use, which is made by classes of 

persons in the pursuit of their occupation or business, such as hackmen, drivers of express wagons, omnibusses, etc. Tiedeman on Municipal Corporations, § 299. Ex parte Dickey, 76 W.Va. 576 (1915) on page 6 "The Legislature can delegate to a municipal corporation the power to regulate the number, character, routes, rates, and hours of service of common carriers on the streets." Ex parte Dickey, 76 W.Va. 576 (1915)

"It will be observed from the language of the ordinance that a distinction is to be drawn between the terms `operator' and `driver'; the `operator' of the service car being the person who is licensed to have the car on the streets in the business of carrying passengers for hire; while the `driver' is the one who actually drives the car. However, in the actual prosecution of business, it was possible for the same person to be both 'operator' and 'driver.'"  Newbill vs. Union Indemnity Co., 60 SE.2d 658 (1933)

"The right of a citizen to travel on public highway is a common right which he has under his right to enjoy “life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness”," Teche Lines, Inc. v Danforth, 195 Miss 226, 12 So.2d 784 (1943)

"the public have the right to use the highway" Gallagher v. Montpelier & Wells R.R.R., 100 Vt. 299, 137 A. 207, 52 A.L.R. 744 (1927) 

"A sale of personal property is not required to be evidenced by any written instrument in order to be valid." Carolina Discount Corp. v. Landis Motor Co., 190 N.C. 157 (1925). 

"Automotive vehicles are lawful means of conveyance and have equal rights upon the streets with horses and carriages."Found on page 4 in the Westlaw pdf file below....

"Even the Legislature has no power to deny to a citizen the right to travel upon the highway and transport his property in the ordinary course of his business or pleasure, though this right may be regulated in accordance with the public interest *207 and convenience. Where one undertakes, however, to make a greater use of the public highways for his own private gain, as by the operation of a stagecoach, an omnibus, a truck, or a motorbus, the state may not only regulate the use of the vehicles on the highway, but may prohibit it. 

A municipality can do so only under a power expressly granted by the state." page 4 on Westlaw pdf.....

"All persons, in the absence of legislative edict, are vested with the right to the use of the streets and highways for travel from one place to another in connection with their business, when such use is incidental to that business. This is an ordinary use of the streets and highways, and is frequently characterized as an inherent or natural right." "No person has an inherent or natural right, however, to make the streets or highways his place of business. Such a use is generally characterized as an extraordinary use." Chicago Coach Co. v. City of Chicago, 337 ILL. 200, 169 N.E. 22.(1929) Found on page 7 In Westlaw PDF

"White's contention that there is a constitutional right to intrastate travel is valid. The Attorney General is correct that the rationale behind Shapiro v. Thompson (1969) 394 U.S. 618, 629-630 [22 L.Ed.2d 600, 612, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1329], is that interstate travel is a necessary element of a federal union. 3 ( [6])We conclude that the right to intrastate travel (which includes intramunicipal travel) is a basic human right protected by the United States and California Constitutions as a whole. Such a right is implicit in the concept of a democratic society and is one of the attributes of personal liberty under common law. (See 1 Blackstone, Commentaries 134; U.S. Const., art. IV, § 2 and the 5th, 9th and 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a) and art. I, § 24. As the court stated in King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority (2d Cir. 1971) 442 F.2d 646, 648: “It would be meaningless to describe the right to travel between states as a fundamental precept of *149 personal liberty and not to acknowledge a correlative constitutional right to travel within a state" In re White, 97 Cal.App.3d 141 (1979)

"We know of no inherent right in one to the use of the highways for commercial purposes. The highways are primarily for the use of the public, and, in the interest of the public, the state may prohibit or regulate, in any way it sees fit, the use of the highways for gain. Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140, 44 S. Ct. 257, 68 L. Ed. 596; Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U. S. 251, 53 S. Ct. 181, 184, 77 L. Ed. 288, 87 A. L. R. 721. In the latter case, it is said: ‘It is well established law that the highways of the state are public property; that their primary and preferred use is for private purposes; and that their use for purposes of gain is special and extraordinary, which, generally at least, the legislature may prohibit or condition as it sees fit.’ " Robertson v. Department of Public Works, 180 Wash. 133 (1934) Found on page 3 in Westlaw pdf below

FYI - It needs to be noted that the case law quote or excerpt below in the case of Robertson v. Department of Public Works, 180 Wash. 133 (1934) is from a dissenting member of the Washington State Supreme court. 

While justice Tolman stated a fact and his opinion (and maybe it should be noted as well that two other justices agreed with him), it's important to know that a dissenting opinion from a justice/s is not binding authority, but it may be used as persuasive authority.

"Complete freedom of the highways is so old and well established a blessing that we have forgotten the days of the ‘Robber Barons' and toll roads and yet, under an act like this, arbitrarily administered, the highways may be completely monopolized. If, through lack of interest, the people submit, then they may look to see the most sacred of their liberties taken from them one by one by more or less rapid encroachment." Robertson v. Department of Public Works, 180 Wash. 133 (1934) on page 8 in the Westlaw pdf file below

" ‘For hire’ vehicles, as provided in section 6313, Rem. Comp. Stats., are defined to mean all motor vehicles other than automobile stages used for the transportation of persons for which transportation remuneration of any kind is received, either directly or indirectly."  International Motor Transit Co. v. City of Seattle, 141 Wash. 194, 251 P. 120 (1926) Found on page 4 in the Westlaw pdf download below

“It is well established law that the highways of the state are public property; that their primary and preferred use is for private purposes; and that their use for purposes of gain is special and extraordinary, which, generally at least, the legislature may prohibit or condition as it sees fit.” Pacific Inland Tariff Bureau v. Schaaf, 1 Wash.2d 210 (1939)

"the right of the citizen to drive on the public street with freedom from police interference, unless he is engaged in suspicious conduct associated in some manner with criminality is a fundamental constitutional right which must be protected by the courts." People v. Horton 14 Cal. App.3rd 930 (1971)

"But if the legislature may dictate who our associates may be, then what becomes of the constitutional protection to personal liberty, which Blackstone says “consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situation, or moving one's person to whatsoever place one's inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law. 1 Bl. Comm. 134." Ex parte Smith, 135 Mo. 223 (1896)

"It was there also held that the real purpose of the act was “to regulate the use of public highways by transportation companies” through “the regulation and control of motor vehicles, operating as common carriers for hire and profit over the public highways,” and that: “The operation of motor vehicles, for the purpose of carrying passengers and freight, for hire and profit over the public highways as a transportation roadbed, is a ‘public service enterprise’ within the constitutional definition of such an enterprise, and as such, subject to regulation and control by the state.” Barbour v. Walker, 126 Okla. 227 (1927)

"If persons can be restrained of their liberty, and assaulted and imprisoned, under such circumstances, without complaint or warrant, then there is no limit to the power of a police officer. Personal liberty, which is guarantied to every citizen under our constitution and laws, consists of the right of locomotion,–to go where one pleases, and when, and to do that which may lead to one's business or pleasure, only so far restrained as the rights of others may make it necessary for the welfare of all other citizens. One may travel along the public highways or in public places; and while conducting themselves in a decent and orderly manner, disturbing no other, and interfering with the rights of no other citizens, there they will be protected under the law, not only in their persons, but in their safe conduct. The constitution and the laws are framed for the public good, and the protection of all citizens, from the highest to the lowest; and no one may be restrained of his liberty, unless he has transgressed some law. Any law which would place the keeping and safe conduct of another in the hands of even a conservator of the peace, unless for some breach of the peace committed in his presence, or upon suspicion of felony, would be most **583 oppressive and unjust, and destroy all the rights which our constitution guaranties. These are rights which existed long before our constitution, and we have taken just pride in their maintenance, making them a part of the fundamental law of the land. 

Whatever the charter and ordinances of the city of Kalamazoo may provide, no police officer or other conservator of the peace can constitutionally be clothed with such power as was attempted to be exercised here." Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich. 573, 44 N.W. 579 (1889)

"...while a citizen has the right to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, that right does not extend to the use of the highways, either in whole or in part, as a place of business for private gain. For the latter purpose no person has a vested right in the use of the highways of the state, but is a privilege or license which the Legislature may grant or withhold in its discretion, or which it may grant upon such conditions as it may see fit to impose, provided the imposition applies impartially. Hadfield v. Lundin, 169 P. 516, 98 Wash. 657, L. R. A. 1918B, 909, Ann. Cas. 1918C, 942; Gizzardelli v. Presbrey, 117 A. 359, 44 R. I. 333; Cummins v. Jones, 155 P. 171, 79 Or. 276; Memphis St. Ry. Co. v. Rapid Transit Co., 139 S. W. 635, 133 Tenn. 99, L. R. A. 1916B, 1143, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 1045; Packard v. Banton, 44 S. Ct. 257, 264 U. S. 140, 68 L. Ed. 598." State v. Johnson, 75 Mont. 240 (1926)

"The Constitution of the United States, within its limited sphere is the supreme law of the land; and it is the duty of all officials, whether legislative, judicial, executive, administrative, or ministerial, to so perform every official act as not to violate the constitutional provisions." Montgomery v. State, 55 Fla. 97 (1908)