STANDING

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STANDING - The Doctrine of Justiciability in THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM

In general, if someone; a private citizen, a corporation, the federal government, a State, a state agency, or other person wants to file an action against you, they must have standing.  To have standing a person,  a government, or corporate entity must have had one of their legal rights violated. Without standing the court lacks subject- matter jurisdiction and would as well have no personam jurisdiction over you, without jurisdiction the case cannot go forward. So when the people get traffic infractions/traffic tickets what legal right is the government claiming the violation of?

U.S. CASE EXCERPTS:

“Standing represents a jurisdictional requirement which remains open to review at all stages of the litigation.”  National Organization for Women, Inc., v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994)

"It is well established, however, that before a federal court can consider the merits of a legal claim, the person seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the court must establish the requisite standing to sue. Article III, of course, *155 gives the federal courts jurisdiction over only “cases and controversies,” and the doctrine of standing serves to identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process." Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L. Ed. 2d 135 (1990) 

"Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, see id., at 756, 104 S.Ct., at 3327; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2210, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740–741, n. 16, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 1368–1369, n. 16, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972);1 and (b) “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical,’ ” Whitmore, supra, 495 U.S., at 155, 110 S.Ct., at 1723 (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 1665, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983)). Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be “fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.” Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare *561 Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 41–42, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 1926, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976). Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable decision.” Id., at 38, 43, 96 S.Ct., at 1924, 1926." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) 

"The Art. III doctrine that requires a litigant to have “standing” to invoke the power of a federal court is perhaps the most important of these doctrines. “In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the *751 court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.” Warth v. Seldin, supra, 422 U.S., at 498, 95 S.Ct., at 2205."....The injury alleged must be, for example, “ ‘distinct and palpable,’ ”Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 1608, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, supra, 422 U.S., at 501, 95 S.Ct., at 2206), and not “abstract” or “conjectural” or “hypothetical,” Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–102, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 1665, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494, 94 S.Ct. 669, 675, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974). The injury must be “fairly” traceable to the challenged action, and relief from the injury must be “likely” to follow from a favorable decision. See Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S., at 38, 41, 96 S.Ct., at 1924, 1925. These terms cannot be defined so as to make application of the constitutional standing requirement a mechanical exercise." Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984)

“The [Supreme] Court has found unfit for adjudication any cause that "is not in any real sense adversary," that "does not assume the `honest and actual antagonistic assertion of rights' to be adjudicated…”  Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961)

"Appellants now urge that their complaint does present an “actual controversy” within the meaning of the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. s 2201, that is ripe for decision. We agree. The test to be applied, of course, is the familiar one stated in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273, 61 S.Ct. 510, 512, 85 L.Ed. 826 (1941): “Basically, the question in each case is whether . . . there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.” Compare, e.g., ibid., with, e.g., Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 89 S.Ct. 956, 22 L.Ed.2d 113 (1969)." Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972)

"the jurisdiction of this court and of the inferior courts of the United States ordained and established by Congress under and by virtue of the third article of the Constitution is limited to cases and controversies in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting on them and does not extend to an issue of constitutional law framed by Congress for the purpose of invoking the advice of this court without real parties or a real case, or to administrative or legislative issues or controversies." Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923)

“the duty of this court, as of every judicial tribunal, is limited to determining rights of persons or of property, which are actually controverted in the particular case before it.”  Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 179 U.S. 405, 21 SCt. 206 (1900)

“In determining whether such rights were denied we are governed by the substance of things, and not by mere form. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Schmidt, 177 U. S. 230, 44 L. ed. 747, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 230.”  Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427 (1901)

"Such a suit is collusive because it is not in any real sense adversary. It does not assume the ‘honest and actual antagonistic assertion of rights' to be adjudicated—a safeguard essential to the integrity of the judicial process, and one which we have held to be indispensable to adjudication of constitutional questions by this Court. Chicago & G.T. Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345, 12 S.Ct. 400, 402, 36 L.Ed. 176; and see Lord v. Veazie, 8 How. 251, 12 L.Ed. 1067; Cleveland v. Chamberlain, 1 Black 419, 17 L.Ed. 93; Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129, 134, 135, 21 L.Ed. 929; Atherton Mills v. Johnston, 259 U.S. 13, 15, 42 S.Ct. 422, 66 L.Ed. 814. 

Whenever in the course of litigation such a defect in the proceedings is brought to the court's attention, it may set aside any adjudication thus procured and dismiss the cause without entering judgment on the **1077 merits. It is the court's duty to do so where, as here, the public interest has been placed at hazard by the amenities of parties to a suit conducted under the domination of only one of them. The district court should have granted the Government's motion to dismiss the suit as collusive. We accordingly vacate the judgment below with instructions to the district court to dismiss the cause on that ground alone." U.S. v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302 (1943)

"Only those whose rights are directly affected can properly question the constitutionality of a state statute, and invoke our jurisdiction in respect thereto."  Hendrick v. State of Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1915)

"We proceed no further than standing. The Constitution gives federal courts the power to adjudicate only genuine “Cases” and “Controversies.” Art. III, § 2. That power includes the requirement that litigants have standing. A plaintiff has standing only if he can “allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). Neither the individual nor the state plaintiffs have shown that the injury they will suffer or have suffered is “fairly traceable” to the “allegedly unlawful conduct” of which they complain." California v. Texas, 141 S.Ct. 2104 (2021)

"To consider the matter from the point of view of another standing requirement, namely, redressability, makes clear that the statutory language alone is not sufficient. To determine whether an injury is redressable, a court will consider the relationship between “the judicial relief requested” and the “injury” suffered. Allen, 468 U.S., at 753, n. 19, 104 S.Ct. 3315." California v. Texas, 141 S.Ct. 2104 (2021)

"It is consequently not surprising that the plaintiffs cannot point to cases that support them. To the  contrary, our cases have consistently spoken of the need to assert an injury that is the result of a statute's actual or threatened enforcement, whether today or in the future. See, e.g.,Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979) (“A plaintiff who challenges a statute must demonstrate a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute's operation or enforcement” (emphasis added)); Virginia v. American Booksellers Assn., Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 392, 108 S.Ct. 636, 98 L.Ed.2d 782 (1988) (requiring “threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In the absence of contemporary enforcement, we have said that a plaintiff claiming standing must show that the likelihood of future enforcement is “substantial.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 164, 134 S.Ct. 2334, 189 L.Ed.2d 246 (2014); see also Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923) (“The party who invokes the power [of Article III courts] must be able to show, not only that the statute is invalid, but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement”)." California v. Texas, 141 S.Ct. 2104 (2021)

"A petitioner does not have standing to sue unless he is ‘interested in, and affected adversely by, the decision’ of which he seeks review. His ‘interest must be of a personal, and not of an official, nature.’ Braxton County Court v. State of West Virginia ex rel. Dillon, 208 U.S. 192, 197, 28 S.Ct. 275, 276, 52 L.Ed. 450; see also Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078. The interest must not be wholly negligible, as **638 that of a taxpayer of the Federal Government is considered to be, Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078; cf. Crampton v. Zabriskie, 101 U.S. 601, 25 L.Ed. 1070. A litigant must show more than that ‘he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.’ Frothingham v. Mellon, supra, 262 U.S. at page 488, 43 S.Ct. at page 601." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951)

"A litigant must show more than that ‘he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.’ Frothingham v. Mellon, supra, 262 U.S. at page 488, 43 S.Ct. at page 601." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951)

"A litigant ordinarily has standing to challenge governmental action of a sort that, if

taken by a private person, would create a right of action cognizable by the courts. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 1 S.Ct. 240, 27 L.Ed. 171.1 Or standing may be based on an interest created by the Constitution or a statute. E.g., Parker v. Fleming, 329 U.S. 531, 67 S.Ct. 463, 91 L.Ed. 479; Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 59 S.Ct. 972, 83 L.Ed. 1385; cf. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939. But if no comparable common-law right exists and no such constitutional or statutory interest has been created, relief is not available judicially. Thus, at least unless capricious discrimination is asserted, there is no protected interest in contracting with the Government. A litigant therefore has no standing *153 to object that an official has misinterpreted his instructions in requiring a particular clause to be included in a contract. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 60 S.Ct. 869, 84 L.Ed. 1108." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951)

"Our nation has thrived on the principle that, outside areas of plainly harmful conduct, every American is left to shape his own life as he thinks best, do what he pleases, go where he pleases." ....Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958)

"But under our form of government, the state does not attempt to control the citizen except as to his conduct to others. John Stuart Mill on ‘Liberty,’ 145, 146; 2 Kent, Comm. 1; 1 Cooley, Bl. 122, 123; Munn v. People of Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, citing Thorpe v. Railroad Co., 27 Vt. 143. The right to manufacture beer for his own use, either food or drink, is certainly an absolute or natural right reserved to every citizen. It is a right guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment;" Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887)

"our system of government, based upon the individuality and intelligence of the citizen, does not claim to control him, except as to his conduct to others, leaving him the sole judge as to all that only affects himself." Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887)

"The fundamental liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices defining personal identity and beliefs. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484– 486, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510. Courts must exercise reasoned judgment in identifying interests of the person so fundamental that the State must accord them its respect." Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015)

"The freedom secured by the Constitution consists, in one of its essential dimensions, of

the right of the individual not to be injured by the unlawful exercise of governmental power; thus, when the rights of persons are violated, the Constitution requires redress by the courts, notwithstanding the more general value of democratic decision making, and this holds true even when protecting individual rights affects issues of the utmost importance and sensitivity." Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015)

"Such a suit is collusive because it is not in any real sense adversary. It does not assume the ‘honest and actual antagonistic assertion of rights' to be adjudicated—a safeguard essential to the integrity of the judicial process, and one which we have held to be indispensable to adjudication of constitutional questions by this Court. Chicago & G.T. Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345, 12 S.Ct. 400, 402, 36 L.Ed. 176; and see Lord v. Veazie, 8 How. 251, 12 L.Ed. 1067; Cleveland v. Chamberlain, 1 Black 419, 17 L.Ed. 93; Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129, 134, 135, 21 L.Ed. 929; Atherton Mills v. Johnston, 259 U.S. 13, 15, 42 S.Ct. 422, 66 L.Ed. 814. Whenever in the course of litigation such a defect in the proceedings is brought to the court's attention, it may set aside any adjudication thus procured and dismiss the cause without entering judgment on the **1077 merits. It is the court's duty to do so where, as here, the public interest has been placed at hazard by the amenities of parties to a suit conducted under the domination of only one of them." U.S. v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302 (1943) 

"Political Liberty consists in the power of doing whatever does not Injure another." Rights of Man, written by Thomas Paine 1792 

LEGAL MAXIMS:

An action is not given to one who is not injured. Black's Law Dictionary 8th Ed. page 1704

"But the maxim applies quid non apparet non est. The fact not appearing is presumed not to exist." The Clara, 102 U.S. 200 (1880)

LEGAL DEFINITIONS:

Justiciable Controversy. Term refers to a real and substantial controversy, which is appropriate for judicial determination, as distinguished from dispute or difference of contingent hypothetical or abstract character. State v. Nardini, 187 Conn. 109, 445 A.2d 304, 307. Compare political question. See case; cause of action controversy.  Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227. Black's Law  Dictionary 6th Ed. p. 865

Demand. The assertion of a legal right; a legal obligation asserted in the courts. An imperative request preferred by one person to another, under a  claim of right, requiring the latter to do or yield something or to abstain from some act. A debt or an amount due. An asking with authority, claiming or challenging as due. Smith v. Municipal Court of Glendale Judicial Dist., Los  Angeles County, 176 Cal.App.2d 534, 334 P.2d 931.  Black's Law Dictionary 5th Edition page 386

Cause of action. The fact or facts which give a person a right to judicial redress or relief against another. The legal effect of an occurrence in terms of redress to a party to the occurrence. A situation or state of facts which would entitle party to sustain action and give him right to seek a judicial remedy in his behalf. Thompson v. Zurich Ins. Co., D.C.Minn., 309 F.Supp. 1178, 1181 Fact, or state of facts, to which law sought to be enforced against a person or thing applies. Facts which give rise to one or more relations of right-duty between two or more persons. Failure to perform legal obligation to do, or refrain from performance of, some act. Matter for which action may be maintained. Unlawful violation or invasion of right. The right which a party has to institute a judicial proceeding. See also, case; claim; failure to state a cause of action; Justiciable controversy; Right of action; Severance of actions; splitting cause of action; suit. Black's Law 6th Ed. p. 221

When you are issued a civil traffic infraction or charged with a crime under the motor vehicle code what  legal right is the government claiming that you violated?

When writing your demand for dismissal or motion to dismiss when challenging your traffic offense, demand that the prosecutor put on the record what legal right does the city, county, or state claim you have violated.